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Prior to July 2009, salaries of the members of the European Parliament were paid by their home country
and there were substantial salary differences between parliamentarians representing different EU countries.
Starting in July 2009, the salary of each member of the Parliament is pegged to 38.5% of a European
Court judge’s salary, paid by the EU. This created an exogenous change in salaries, the magnitude
and direction of which varied substantially between parliamentarians.  Parliamentarians receive per
diem compensation for each plenary session they attend, but salaries constitute unearned income as
they are independent of attendance to the Parliament. Using detailed information on each parliamentarian
of the European Parliament between 2004 and 2011 we show that an increase in salaries reduces attendance
to plenary sessions and an increase in per diem compensation increases it. We also show that corruption
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Is Leisure a Normal Good? Evidence from the European Parliament 
 
I.  Introduction 
  The impact of income on labor supply is a key piece of information in the analysis of the 
determinants of working hours and it plays a significant role in a variety of settings, including 
tax and welfare policy.
1  There is, however, substantial variation in the magnitude of the income 
elasticity of labor supply reported in the literature.  Pencavel (1986) summarizes the research 
published in the 1970s  and shows that the estimates of the marginal propensity to earn are in the 
range of -0.70 to +0.08, where positive estimates suggest that labor supply goes up as income 
rises and they therefore violate the assumption that leisure is a normal good (Pencavel 1986; 
Tables 1.19 and 1.21).
2  A more recent survey similarly reports income elasticity estimates in the 
range of -0.40 to +0.52  (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999).     
  One of the primary reasons for such a discrepancy in income elasticity estimates is the 
difficulty in the measurement of nonwage income and the struggle to find truly exogenous 
movements in nonwage income.   A limited number of papers were able to provide reliable 
estimates of income elasticity of labor supply by exploiting exogenous increases in income that 
emerged in narrow settings.  For example, Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen (1993) analyzed the 
labor force participation behavior of individuals who received inheritance and reported an 
                                                            
1 For example, if government revenue generated by higher taxes is spent on transfers, it is important to 
determine the proper magnitude of income-compensated wage elasticity of labor supply to determine the 
impact of taxes on labor supply and hours worked (Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote 2005) .  To make an 
inference on the magnitude of compensated wage elasticity, one needs both the uncompensated wage 
elasticity and income elasticity. 
 
2 The Slutsky equation decomposes the impact of  a wage (w) increase in substitution and income effects 
as ∂h/∂w= s+ h (∂h/∂y), where h is hours worked, s stands for the substitution effect, and y represents 
nonwage income.  Multiplying the Slutsky equation by w/h gives E=E*+ w(∂h/∂y), where the 
uncompensated elasticity of labor supply with respect to wage is E=(∂h/∂w)(w/h),  E* is income-
compensated elasticity of labor supply, and w(∂h/∂y) is termed  marginal propensity to earn by Pencavel.   2 
 
implied unearned income elasticity of  -0.03.  Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) used PSID data and 
found that the impact of inheritance receipt on labor supply was almost zero.   Imbens, Rubin, 
and Sacerdote (2001) employed data on lottery winners in Massachusetts in the mid-1980s to 
investigate the impact of lottery prizes on labor market earnings.  The estimated marginal 
propensity to earn was about -0.11. 
3 
In this paper we provide an estimate of the income elasticity of labor supply using data on 
the members of the European Parliament.  There are advantages of analyzing this group of 
individuals.  First, the structure of compensation pertaining to the members of the European 
Parliament includes the main ingredients of textbook labor supply analysis.  Each member of the 
Parliament receives a per diem compensation for every parliamentary session he/she attends. 
This per diem compensation, which is €304 currently (about $438 at the current exchange rate), 
is not intended to cover travel expenses  because travel expenses that are related to attendance in 
parliamentary sessions are reimbursed separately by the European Parliament.  Thus, per diem 
compensation is the daily wage for the parliamentarians. Each member of the Parliament also 
receives a fixed salary, which does not depend on the number of sessions attended.  Put 
differently, the salary is independent of the work effort and the attendance record of the 
parliamentarian, and therefore it effectively constitutes unearned income.  
Much of the labor supply literature has grappled with serious measurement problems in 
wages, hours, and nonwage income. This is not the case here because the daily wage rate (per 
diem compensation), labor supply (the number of sessions attended) and nonwage income 
(salary) are recorded with precision by the European Parliament, and are therefore not subject to 
                                                            
3 Of course, a trade-off exists between obtaining unbiased estimates of income elasticity by exploiting 
exogenous increases in unearned income in specific populations such as lottery winners and inheritance 
recipients, and the external validity of the results.  This point is relevant for this paper as well. 
 3 
 
measurement error.  More importantly, we exploit an exogenous change in nonwage income due 
to an alteration in the salary structure of the European Parliament, implemented in 2009, which 
allows us to identify the income elasticity of labor supply.  Prior to 2009, members of the 
European Parliament received salaries which were determined by their home country.   As a 
result, there was substantial variation in salaries between members representing different 
countries.  For example, the salary of a member from Poland was €29,209, whereas the salary of 
a member from Italy was €142,146.  Starting with the 7
th Term in the Summer of 2009, the 
salaries were equalized between the Members of the Parliament to €91,983 (about $132,500), 
and then were increased slightly in each subsequent year.  This created an exogenous change in 
unearned income, the magnitude and direction of which varied substantially between 
parliamentarians. 
We compiled the attendance record (by plenary session) of each member of the European 
Parliament during the sixth and the seventh parliamentary terms of the European Parliament 
(from 2004 to 2011).  Merging this information with personal characteristics of the members 
obtained from their CVs and the information on their salaries and per diem compensation, 
produced a panel data set that spans 2004-2011.  We find that an increase in unearned income 
(salaries) of the parliamentarians reduces the number of plenary sessions attended, although the 
estimated elasticity is small.  An increase in daily wages (per diem compensation) increases 
labor supply. We also find that members of the EU parliament from countries with higher levels 
of corruption have a tendency to attend fewer sessions and that this effect is concentrated among 
seasoned members of the Parliament. 4 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II presents background information 
on the European Parliament. In sections III we describe the empirical framework.  Section IV 
presents the data. Section V describes the results and VI is the conclusion. 
 
II. The Structure of the European Union Parliament  
The European Parliament is the elected legislative body of the European Union (EU).  
The elections of the European Parliament are held every five years by voters in each of the 27 
member countries of the EU.  The most recent elections were held in the Summer of 2009 for the 
seventh parliamentary term.  Because of proportional representation, countries with bigger 
populations seat more parliamentarians. Currently, the number of seats ranges from five (Malta) 
to 99 (Germany) in a total of 736 seats.   
Members of the Parliament convene both in Brussels and Strasbourg for plenary 
sessions.
4  Some members of the Parliament live in their home country rather than in Brussels, 
and their travel expenses are paid by the Parliament.  The parliamentarians also receive 
allowances for their expenses related to costs of running their offices. Furthermore, each 
parliamentarian receives a per diem compensation for each day they attend the parliamentary 
sessions.   This per diem pay was €262 in 2004,  and it went up to  €304 in 2011 (about $438). 
Until the seventh Parliamentary term, the salary of each member was pegged to the 
salary of a parliamentarian in their home country.  For example, the salary of a European 
Parliamentarian from Spain was the same as the salary of the members of the Spanish 
Parliament in Madrid, and the salary of an EU parliamentarian representing Austria was equal to 
the salary of the member of the Austrian parliament in Vienna. A new statute for the European 
Parliament, enacted on June 23, 2005, equalized the salaries of the Members of the EU 
                                                            
4 In Brussels they also attend meetings of the parliamentary committees and political groups. 5 
 
Parliament.  More specifically, each parliamentarian’s salary is now equivalent  to 38.5 percent 
of a European Court judge's salary, paid out of the EU budget.  This new salary structure 
became effective in the seventh term of the Parliament, in Summer 2009.  This amount is 
currently €95,483. 
Table 1 displays information about the 14 parliamentary periods that will be used in this 
paper.  Periods 1-10 pertain to the sixth parliamentary term spanning July 2004 to June 2009.  
Each year consists of two terms: the first term covers the period from September 1 to December 
31, while the second one covers January 1 to August 31.  The duration of the terms right before 
and right after an election is slightly different because they are disrupted by elections (periods 1, 
10 and 11).  Table 1 also displays the number of plenary sessions that took place in each period.   
For example, in 2008 there were a total of 63 plenary sessions (39+24).   A member of the 
parliament who attended all of these 63 plenary sessions would have earned €18,081  in per 
diem allowance, in addition to the fixed base salary.  This means, for example, that a member of 
the Parliament from Slovakia would have doubled his/her income by attending all sessions (the 
salary received by Slovakian members was €18,000 in 2008).  A Parliamentarian from Spain 
would have increased his/her income by 41 percent, and the income of a member from Finland 
would have increased by 26 percent.   
As of June 6, 2011, which was the last day of data collection for this paper, 25 plenary 
sessions were held in the 14
th Period.  This period, which started on January 1, 2011 has 
adjourned on July 7, and there were nine more plenary sessions between June 6 and  July 7.  
This means that the number of sessions attended is underreported in the data for this last period.  
However, dropping this last period from the analysis did not alter the results.  6 
 
Table 2 displays the number of Parliamentarians from each EU country in June 2009 (at 
the end of the sixth Parliament), the share of that country in total seats in the EU Parliament, and 
their average salaries during the sixth term, from July 2004 to June 2009.
5  There is substantial 
variation in salaries.  The highest salary in the EU Parliament was €142,146 paid by the Italian 
government to the Italian Members of the EU Parliament.  Bulgarians received the lowest salary 
of €10,226. 
 As mentioned earlier, starting with the seventh parliamentary term in July 2009, each 
member’s salary was set to €91,983, regardless of the country of representation.  Figure 1 
displays this information, where the dashed line is the average real salary (nominal salaries 
deflated by the EU price index) of those members of the European Parliament (weighted by the 
number of the seats), whose salaries were greater than the unified post-2009 salary.  This group 
consists of the members of the Parliament from Italy, Ireland and Austria.  The solid line before 
2009 shows the weighted average real salaries of the parliamentarians from the remaining 24 
countries whose salaries were below that of the post-2009 salary. 
 Figure 2 displays the difference in salaries between the two groups of parliamentarians.  
More specifically, the heavy line in Figure 2 is the difference in average salaries between the 
Italian, Irish and Austrian members of the Parliament, and those of the second group, consisting 
of all other members.   This salary difference (measured on the right-hand scale) was about  
€70,000  between 2004 and 2009, and it became zero in the seventh parliamentary term after the 
European Parliament decided that each member would be paid the same salary.   The key 
variable of the analysis is the labor supply (plenary sessions attended) of the members of the 
Parliament. This variable is based on official attendance records.  Figure 2 also displays the 
difference in average attendance rate between the two groups.  Between 2004 and 2009, the 
                                                            
5 Romania and Bulgaria became members on January 1, 2007. 7 
 
attendance rate of the first group (high earners) was about five percentage points lower than that 
of the second group (low earners).  With the start of the seventh parliamentary term, where the 
salaries of the members in the first group declined and the salaries of the members in the second 
group increased, the difference in the attendance rates went down to about zero.   Our empirical 
analysis will not be based on a difference-in-differences framework; nevertheless Figure 2 is 
informative as it suggests that hours of work of those who faced a decline in their unearned 
income went up in comparison to those who faced an increase in their unearned income. 
 
 III Empirical Specification  
The empirical counterpart of a standard static labor supply equation can be described as: 
 Attendanceict = α+ β Salaryict + γ Wageict +Xict Ω+ Cct Ψ + τt + λ + εict, 
where Attendanceict stands for the number of plenary sessions attended by the i
th member of the 
European Parliament who represents country c, in period t.  Salaryict  represents the salary of the 
Parliamentarian i from country c in period t.  Wageict is per diem compensation for attending a 
session.  Salary and Wage are deflated by the EU price index. The vector X includes personal 
characteristics such as gender, age, education and tenure in the Parliament.   It also includes the 
average attendance record of other Parliamentarians in i’s political group as explained below.  
Cct includes measures of per capita income and the extent of corruption in the home country to 
capture socio-economic attributes of the country of origin of the Parliamentarian. These variables 
gauge different dimensions of economic development which may impact hours worked.  λ 
represents a time trend, τt stands for period effects, and εict is an error term.  The time trend 
controls for a potential secular trend in attendance.  Period effects are controlled for to account 
for the fact the Fall period (September-December) is shorter than the Winter-Spring period , and 8 
 
for the possibility that some periods require heavier legislative action than other due to 
idiosyncratic political circumstances.  Robust standard errors are clustered at the parliamentarian 
level.  We also estimate specifications which include Parliamentarian fixed-effects, instead of 
personal attributes.   
To make use of the exogenous variation in the salaries of parliamentarians, we focus on 
parliamentarians who served in the sixth parliament (where the salaries were paid by their home 
country) and who also served in the seventh Parliament (where the salaries are paid by the EU). 
These parliamentarians faced an exogenous change in their salaries between the sixth and the 
seventh terms.  This strategy involves the evaluation of the differences in parliamentarians’ 
attendance records before and after the change in the salary structure.  We expect a negative 
relationship between Salary and Attendance.  In other words, those individuals who experienced 
a raise are expected to attend fewer parliamentary sessions than they did before the raise. 
Similarly, those parliamentarians who experienced a pay cut are expected to attend more 
sessions.   Although salary in this context constitutes unearned income for the members of the 
parliament, they may have other types of unearned income, from other sources, as well.  We 
assume that variations in the European Parliament salary are uncorrelated with other 
components of their total unearned income. 
The labor supply of the parliamentarians who served both in the sixth and the seventh 
parliamentary terms may have declined during the seventh term, not because of the increase in 
salary but because of aging or because they are more seasoned in the seventh term and therefore 
feel less pressure to attend the sessions.  We include controls for age and tenure to capture the 
impact of a potential change in “tastes for work” .  However, to address this potential issue, we 
also estimate the model using the sample of freshman and the sample of seasoned 9 
 
parliamentarians. We define freshman parliamentarians as those who have never been elected 
before, and seasoned parliamentarians as those who had been elected at least once before.  We 
compare the attendance record of freshmen of  the sixth Parliament (2004-2009) to that of those 
who entered the seventh Parliament in 2009 as freshmen.  The former group faced a different 
salary structure than the latter one.   The same strategy is applied to the sample of seasoned 
parliamentarians, where we compare seasoned parliamentarians who faced the new salary 
regime in the seventh Parliament to seasoned parliamentarians from the same country who faced 
a different salary in the sixth Parliament.  If characteristics that may affect the attendance of the 
parliamentarians are controlled for, the comparison of the number of sessions attended by the 
freshman and seasoned parliamentarians before and after the change in the salary structure 
identifies the impact of salary on attendance. 
It can be argued that the composition of the re-elected parliamentarians for the seventh 
parliamentary term may depend on the change in salaries.  Specifically, the increase in salaries 
between the sixth and the seventh terms could have attracted a certain breed of individuals to the 
EU Parliament whose aim was to earn high salaries but not work hard.   However, we show that 
the re-election propensity is not related to the extent of the increase/decrease in salaries, 
suggesting that the probability of being re-elected is about the same in a country regardless of 
whether the parliamentarians received a pay raise or a pay cut.  Nevertheless, we entertain the 
hypothesis that the change in the salary structure has attracted shirkers to the seventh Parliament.  
We identify such potential shirkers as explained below.  The estimated income elasticity among 
this group is not different from that obtained by using the entire sample, indicating that the 
results are not driven by self-selection of certain type of individuals to the parliament following 




Individual level data on parliamentarians are obtained from the website 
www.votewatch.eu which is an independent monitoring website of EU politics. It provides 
detailed information about the members of the European Parliament regarding their activities in 
the parliament as well as their personal characteristics.  Votewatch.eu  employs the European 
Parliament's attendance, voting and activity data, which is available through the Parliament's 
website, and organizes them to make it available to the general public. The website covers the 
activities of the Parliamentarians during the entire sixth and seventh parliamentary terms, 
between 2004 and 2011. 
The attendance records of the parliamentarians are provided as the proportion of the 
sessions each member has attended in each period. Periods are defined in Table 1.  For example, 
the first period starts on July 20,
 2004 (the first day of sixth parliamentary term) and continues 
until December 31, 2004.   Because we know the number of plenary sessions in each period, 
multiplying the official attendance rate for each period by the number of plenary sessions in that 
period generates the number of sessions attended by each member.
6   
Salaries of the members of the EU Parliament were set to €91,983 in July 2009 as 
described earlier.  They were increased to €93,686 in January 2010, and to €95,482  in January 
2011.
7 Before July 2009, Parliamentarians’ salaries were determined by their country of origin. 
The salary information prior to this date is obtained from two sources.  The information 
                                                            
6 For example, if a particular Member of the Parliament has a reported attendance rate of 80 percent in 
Period 1 (July 20, 2004 – December 31, 2004), given that there were 24 plenary sessions during that 
period, we calculate that this particular Parliamentarian has attended 19 sessions during this period. 
 
7 Salary information is obtained from Francisco José Estela Burriel, head of the Members’ Travel and 
Subsistence Expenses Unit of the European Parliament. 
 11 
 
pertaining to 2004 is obtained from the EU information website of Folketing (the National 
Parliament of Denmark).
8 For the years 2005-2009, we used the information provided by the UK 
Office of the European Parliament’s Directorate General for Communication.  Because 
parliamentarian salaries were not available for all countries and all years, we assigned to each 
parliamentarian the average of that country’s parliamentarian salary in the years before 2009.
9  
This is not problematic because the existing salary data show that salaries do not change 
appreciably between 2004 and 2009 in any country. 
Other individual level variables are constructed using information provided by the 
www.votewatch.eu.  Specifically, we went to the web segment of each EU Parliamentarian to 
identify their gender, and to obtain information on the date of birth, which is used to calculate 
age.
10   The web site also contains short CVs of the Parliamentarians. Using the information on 
their CVs, we created a dummy variable, PhD-MD, which takes the value of one if the member 
of the Parliament has a PhD or an MD degree.   The variable titled Political Group Attendance  
measures the average attendance of other members of the Parliamentarian’s political group. 
11 
This variable is intended to capture the extent of involvement of the member’s political group in 
                                                            
8  http://www.eu-oplysningen.dk/euo_en/spsv/all/32/ 
 
9 Country-specific salary information is obtained from Michelle Kneeshaw of the UK Office of the 
European Parliament’s Directorate General for Communication, who provided us with three fact sheets on 
the salaries of the members of national parliaments in the EU. The fact sheets dated July 1, 2005, 
November 8, 2007, and April 14, 2009 display the salaries of the members of the national parliaments in 
2005, 2006/2007, and 2007/2008/2009, respectively. 
 
10 In a few cases, the web site does not contain a picture of the member of the Parliament.  In those cases, 
we tried to identify gender by the first name. 
 
11 Parliamentarians are grouped by political affiliation and not by nationality. There are currently seven 
political groups in the European Parliament.  Parliamentarians may not belong to more than one political 




12   We also created seven indicator variables to identify whether the 
individual was a member of any of the seven European parliamentary terms.
13 Indicator variables 
1
st Parliament, 2
nd Parliament, and so on identify whether an individual has served  in the 1
st 
Parliament, 2
nd parliament and so on, respectively. 
Table 3A reports the descriptive statistics.  The four columns pertain to four different 
samples that are used in various specifications.  Column (1) includes the main sample, which 
consists of the members of the European Parliament who were elected to the 6
th  and/or 7
th 
Parliament.
14  Average attendance per Plenary Session is 25 days, and average salary is €76,700  
Average per diem pay is 285 Euros.  Tenure in the 6
th or 7
th Parliament  is intended to capture 
the extent of the experience of the parliamentarian.  This variable measures the cumulative 
number of periods attended.  For example, the value of this variable for a member who attended 
at least one plenary session in all periods of the sixth term would be 1 in period 1 and 10 in 
period 10  (see Table 1).  For a member, who was part of the sixth parliamentary term and who is 
re-elected for the seventh term, and who attended at least one session in each period, this variable 
                                                            
12 There are currently 7 political groups in the EU Parliament: European People's Party (EPP), Progressive 
Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), 
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), The Greens–European Free Alliance (Greens–EFA), 
European United Left–Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL), Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD). In 
addition, some Members of the Parliament do not belong to any political groups. These Members are 
referred to as Non-Inscrits (NI). ECR group is recently formed with the beginning of the 7
th parliament. 
Two political groups from the 6
th parliament, Independence/Democracy (IND/DEM) and Union for 
Europe of the Nations (UEN) merged to form EFD in the 7
th parliament. The political group European 
People's Party–European Democrats (EPP–ED) in the 6
th parliament is divided into two political parties in 
the 7
th parliament, EPP and ECR. 
 
13  The first EU Parliamentary term spanned  the years 1979 to 1984, and there is one person in the 
seventh Parliament who was a member of all seven parliamentary terms, thus serving continuously from 
1979 to 2011.  We obtained the information about whether a member of the 6th or 7th Parliament was 
also a parliamentarian in the previous terms from the data set used by Hix, Noury and Gerard (2006). 
 
14 At the end of the 6
th Parliament, in the Summer of 2009, there were 776 Members in the European 
Parliament.  13 
 
would take the value of 14.  A person who is elected for the seventh term but who was not part of 
then the sixth term, would have a value of 4 for this variable in period 14.   
Table 3B displays the summary statistics for member attributes, using each member as a 
unit of observation.  There are 1,151 unique members of the parliament in the data set who were 
part of the sixth and/or the seventh Parliament. Thirty-two percent of the members are female, 
and 22 percent have a PhD or MD degree.  The average age is 50.  The mean value of the 
dichotomous variable Member in the 1
st Term is 0.01 in column (1).  This means that one percent 
of the 1,151 members (12 people) served in the first parliamentary term (1979 to 1984). 
Column (2) of Table 3A displays the descriptive statistics of those Parliamentarians who 
served in the sixth parliamentary term and were re-elected for the seventh term.  This group 
consists of 361 people.  Note that these individuals were exposed to the exogenous change in 
salaries that was implemented at the beginning of the seventh Parliament. Of the 361 re-elected 
members, 36 are Austrians, Irish or Italians.  These members faced a decrease in their salaries 
between the sixth and the seventh terms.  The remaining 325 members of the re-elected group 
faced an increase in their salaries. 
Column (3) of Table 3A presents descriptive statistic pertaining to freshman members in 
the sample.  Put differently, these statistics pertain to the freshman years of the Parliamentarians.  
Note again that our data set spans the sixth and the seventh Parliaments (see Table 1).  Therefore, 
if a member is elected to the sixth Parliament as a freshman and re-elected to the seventh 
Parliament, then his/her information (attendance, salary, etc.) during the sixth Parliament is 
included in this sample.  Similarly, this sample contains information on those individuals who 
are elected to the European Parliament first time for the seventh term. 14 
 
Finally, column (4) of  Table 3A displays descriptive statistics on seasoned member-
sessions. A seasoned member is defined as somebody have has served at least one prior term in 
the European Parliament.  For example, if a member has served in the sixth and the seventh 
Parliaments, data summarized in column (4) contain information about this person in his/her 
seventh term.  As another example, if a member has served in the third, sixth and seventh 
Parliaments, column (4) contains data on this member’s activity during the sixth and seventh 
Parliaments.
15   
Real GDP per capita is obtained from World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
database. 
16,17  The corruption variable is constructed using Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CoPI).
18  For each year between 2004 and 2010, we ranked the 
countries according to the CoPI and determined the percentile ranking of each country, where a 
higher percentile indicates a higher level corruption in the world corruption distribution in that 
year. Because the CoPI is not available in 2011, we assigned the same values to each country as 
in 2010, which assumes that their world-wide ranking remains the same during that year.
19 
                                                            
15  Note that attendance data are only available for the 6
th and the 7
th parliaments.  Therefore, our data are 
restricted to these terms (2004-2011).  However, we have information on whether any member has served 
in previous Parliaments.  Therefore, we can identify whether Parliamentarians in our sample have served 
in prior terms. 
16 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
17 GDP per capita is not available for 2010 and 2011, therefore it is extrapolated linearly. 
18  See Mocan (2008) and Mocan (2009) for analysis on objective and subjective measures of corruption. 
19 TI’s CPI ranges from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt).  We obtained the CPI for each country 
pertaining to the years 2004 to 2010 (the last year available).  We reversed the CPI scale so that higher 
values represent more corruption. The countries in the TI data are Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, 
Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, 
Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, 
Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, 
Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, 15 
 
Table 3B shows that the average value of Corruption pertaining to the countries in the EU 
is 21, indicating the 21
st percentile on the World corruption distribution.   In 2010, Iraq and 
Myanmar are ranked as the most corrupt countries (the 99
th and 100
th percentiles on the World 
corruption distribution, respectively); Denmark is the least corrupt country.   Germany is in the 
12
th percentile, Spain is in the 21
st percentile, Bulgaria and Italy are is in the 44
th percentile and 
Greece is ranked in the 51




Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 present the results that employ the entire sample, 
consisting of  all Parliamentarians who participated in the sixth and/or the seventh Parliaments.  
All regressions in all tables include 13 dummy variables for period effects and a time trend.  
Column (1) reports result from the model that includes parliamentarian fixed effects and column 
(2) presents the estimates obtained from the specification that includes personal attributes of the 
parliamentarians.   
The coefficient of Salary is negative and highly significant, indicating that an increase in 
salary (unearned income in this context) generates a decline in the number of plenary sessions 
attended.  The coefficients in columns (1) and (2) imply an income elasticity of -0.04  to  -0.08.  
This estimate is similar in magnitude to those obtained from inheritance recipients and lottery 
winners. Per diem pay, which is the daily wage, has a positive impact on attendance.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, 
Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, 
Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 16 
 
implied uncompensated wage elasticity is in the range of  0.95 to 1.06, which is consistent with 
estimates reported by previous research that used European data.
20   
Peer pressure seems to have an effect on attendance behavior.  If there is a 10 percentage 
point increase in the sessions attended by the colleagues of the Parliamentarian who belong to 
the same political group, he/she attends one more session during a plenary session period.
21 Age 
has a small non-linear impact on attendance.  In the specification reported by column (2), 
attendance peaks at age 59.    
There is little variation in per capita income and corruption within a country from year to 
year.  This makes is difficult to estimate the coefficients with precision.  Nevertheless, the 
coefficient of corruption is estimated reasonably precisely.  The results indicate that members of 
the European Parliament who represent more corrupt countries have a tendency to attend fewer 
sessions.    Fisman and Miguel (2007) analyzed United Nations diplomats in New York City.  
They found that diplomats from high-corruption counties violate parking regulations (at zero cost 
to themselves because of diplomatic immunity) more frequently than diplomats from low-
corruption counties.   Our result is similar in essence to those reported by Fisman and Miguel as 




20 For example, Arellano and Meghir (1992) use British family Expenditure Survey and British Labor 
Force Survey and report uncompensated wage elasticity as high as  0.71.  Colombino and Del Boca 
(1990) report estimates in the range of 0.66 to 1.18 using Italian data. van Soest et al. (1990) use Dutch 
data and estimate an uncompensated wage elasticity of 0.79;  Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz (199) 
report an estimate of about 0.8 using Swedish data. Arrufat and Zabalza (1986) use the British general 
Household Survey and report and estimate of 2.03. 
 
21 A causal interpretation is difficult here because the political groups are being formed endogenously.  
Although political views are arguably the most significant determinants of group formation,  proclivity 
towards shirking could be one aspect of self-selection into groups. 17 
 
Re-elected Parliamentarians  
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 report the results from the pooled sample which includes 
all members of the European Parliament in the sixth and the seventh terms.  Columns (3) and (4) 
report the results that employ data on the parliamentarians who are observed both before and 
after the change in the salary structure. There are 361 such members in our sample (who were 
served in the sixth term and were re-elected and served for the seventh term).  This analysis 
involves a comparison of the attendance of the same parliamentarians before and after the change 
in the salary structure.  The results are presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.  They are 
very similar to the ones obtained from the whole sample.   
The specification that uses the re-elected parliamentarians identifies the income elasticity 
through the exogenous change in salaries faced by these individuals.  The salary increase, 
however, was implemented between the sixth and the seventh parliamentary sessions.  Therefore, 
it is possible that those re-elected parliamentarians had a strong desire to enjoy the higher 
salaries that would be forthcoming in the seventh term. Conversely, the Italian, Irish and 
Austrian members who served in the sixth term were expecting a salary decline with the start of 
the seventh term. This could have curtailed their desire to run for re-election.  This argument 
suggests that the upcoming salary increase/decrease may have altered the willingness and the 
propensity to re-enter the seventh Parliament. The data do not support this hypothesis.   Figure 3 
displays the re-election rates among the incumbent parliamentarians of the sixth Parliament (the 
proportion that is re-elected to the seventh Parliament) in each country as a function of the 
change in salary between the two terms.  The solid line shows the fitted values from a regression 
of the former on the latter.  No clear pattern emerges. The highest salary increase was enjoyed by 
Bulgarians with an increase of more than 800% (from €10,226 to €91,983).  Yet, the re-election 18 
 
rate among the Bulgarian members of the European parliament was a moderate 53 percent.  
Members of the European Parliament from the UK had a higher re-election rate (71 percent), 
although the salary increase they faced between the sixth and the seventh parliaments was only 
11 percent.   Parliamentarians from Malta, Slovakia and Latvia had nearly equivalent salary 
increases (460% to 490%) but their re-election rates ranged from 37 percent to 80 percent.  
As a complementary analysis we calculated the proportion of re-elected Parliamentarians 
in each country between the fifth and the sixth Parliaments and compared these rates to the re-
election rates between the sixth and the seventh Parliaments. There was no change in the salary 
structure between the fifth and the sixth Parliaments.  Thus, the re-election rates between the 
fifth and the sixth terms are the product of domestic political processes and the structure of 
political establishment in each country, and they do not depend of expected EU Parliamentarian 
compensation.  If the new salary structure implemented by the EU has altered the re-election 
dynamics, the re-election probabilities would be different between the transitions from fifth to 
sixth and from sixth to the seventh Parliaments.   
Figure 4 shows that this is not the case. The re-election rates between the 5
th and 6
th 
Parliaments are measured on the horizontal axis and the rates between the 6
th and the 7
th 
Parliament are measured vertically.  The heavy line represents the 45-degree. The numbers in 
parentheses following country names show the percent change in salaries between the 6
th and 7
th 
Parliaments.  For example, the members of the European Parliament from the UK faced an 11 
percent increase in their salaries between the 6
th and the 7
th Parliaments. Their re-election rate to 
the 7
th term was 72 percent, which was essentially equal to the re-election rate to the 6
th term 
when there was no change in salaries.
22  Similarly, the re-election rates of Portuguese members 
                                                            
22  This graph contains only 15 countries because the EU had 15 member countries in the 5
th Parliament.  
(Poland became the 16
th  member and sent to the Parliament appointed members in May 2004). 19 
 
are very similar between the two elections (33% and 38%), despite the fact that the election for 
the 7
th Parliament was associated with an 87 percent salary increase for the Portuguese members.   
The same is true for Italians who faced a 34 percent decline in salary when the European 
Parliament equalized salaries in the seventh Parliament. Yet, the re-election rate of Italians in 
2009 is very similar to their re-election rate five years earlier when there was no change in 
salaries.  The biggest drop in the re-election rate took place in Sweden, the members of which 
faced a 44 percent salary increase, and the second largest drop took place in Ireland, which faced 
a 2 percent salary decrease.  In summary, there is no evidence that the change in the salary 
structure between the 6
th and the 7




Freshman and Seasoned Parliamentarians 
In Table 5 we report the results obtained from two other groups.  The first group consists 
of freshman parliamentarians.  These are the individuals who are elected for the very first time to 
the European Parliament, beginning with the sixth or the seventh term.   The idea behind this 
exercise is to create a sample of individuals who are similar by the virtue of being a novice in the 
Parliament.  Thus, their general attitude towards attendance should be similar. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
23 This discussion assumes that the incumbent member of the European Parliament has the advantage in 
the elections over the challengers.   It is also possible that an upcoming salary increase may motivate a 
large number of challengers to enter the election, which may lower the chances of re-election of the 
incumbent.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that is not the case. For example, in Romania, which 
experienced a 340 percent jump in salary, the number of candidates went down to 289 in the 2009 
elections from 549 candidates in the previous election (http://www.alegeri.tv/ ). In Bulgaria, where the 
salary increase was the largest, the number of candidates also went down to 215 in 2009 from 218 
candidates in the previous election (obtained from the Bulgarian Central Election Committee of the 




The second sample consists of seasoned politicians.  They have been members of the 
European Parliament in previous terms.  In this sample of experienced members, we retain 
observations that belong to parliamentarians who have served at least one previous term in the 
European Parliament between since its inception in 1979.  The results that are obtained from the 
freshman sample and the seasoned parliamentarian sample are very similar to those reported in 
Table 4.  The impact of country corruption on attendance is not significant in the freshmen 
sample, but is significant in the sample of seasoned members (column 3) and the coefficient is 
larger in magnitude in comparison to the one obtained from the whole sample.  This suggests 
that the impact of country corruption on attendance is concentrated on seasoned 
parliamentarians.  For example, a seasoned parliamentarian who represents a country that is 
ranked in the 50
th percentile of world corruption distribution (such as Greece) attends two fewer 
session per plenary period in comparison to a seasoned parliamentarian who is from a country 
which has low corruption (such as Ireland, which is on the 10
th percentile of the corruption 
distribution). 
  The overwhelming majority of the variation in salaries is generated by the change in 
salaries between the sixth and seventh terms in 2009.  Therefore, as an alternative identification 
strategy, we focused on re-elected parliamentarians who were present both in the sixth and the 
seventh Parliaments.  We calculated the average attendance and the average salary for these 
parliamentarians within the sixth and the seventh Parliaments, and ran a regression of the change 
in average attendance between the sixth and the seventh parliaments on the change in mean 
salary (as well as the changes in other variables) during the same period.  This regression is 21 
 
based on 361 re-elected parliamentarians. The result, which is reported in column (1) of Table 6, 
is very similar to ones reported earlier.
24   
  Columns (2) and (3) of Table 6 report the results of similar regressions.  Here, we use the 
freshmen sample and the sample of seasoned parliamentarians, respectively.  For example, in 
column (2) we use the sample consisting of the 850 freshmen parliamentarians who were elected 
for the first time either to the sixth Parliament or the seventh Parliament, and we employ their 
average attributes (attendance, salary, age, and so on) in the regressions.  Column (3) reports the 
results pertaining to the sample of seasoned parliamentarians.  There are 526 unique seasoned 
parliamentarians who contribute 662 observations to the model in column (3). 
25  Once again, the 
results do not change. 
Finally, we calculate country averages for both the sixth and the seventh parliaments.  
Here, countries are the units of observation (there are 27 countries represented in the sixth and 
the seventh European parliaments).  Thus, the dependent variable is the average number of 
European Parliament sessions attended by the parliamentarians of a given country.   The results 
are very similar to those obtained from previous regressions.  Consistent with economic theory, 
they indicate that an increase in salaries pertaining to the parliamentarians of a given country 
reduces the number of sessions attended by those parliamentarians.  
 
Robustness 
Notice that after the implementation of the new salary structure in July 2009, there has 
been only four plenary sessions in the European Parliament until the Summer of 2001, whereas 
                                                            
24 Running the regression in levels and adding individual fixed–effects provided the same results. 
25  Some seasoned parliamentarians contribute two observations (for the sixth and for the seventh 
parliaments) because they were seasoned when they entered the sixth parliament (i.e. they served before 
the sixth parliament) and they also got re-elected to the seventh parliament. 22 
 
there were 10 plenary sessions in the sixth Parliament between 2004 and 2009 (see Table 1).  We 
re-estimated all models using the four plenary sessions that took place so far in the seventh 
Parliament and the first four plenary sessions of the sixth Parliament.  The results did not change.  
In the interest of space we only report one table.  Table 7 is the counterpart of Table 5, where the 
sample consists of the eight plenary sessions described above.  Table 7 shows that the results are 
very similar to those reported in Table 5. 
Finally, although there is no evidence that the re-election rates have changed between the 
sixth and the seventh parliaments as discussed earlier (see figures 3 and 4), we re-visit the 
postulate that those who are elected to the seventh Parliament in 2009 could be shirkers.  Under 
this scenario, salaries increased and attendance declined in the seventh Parliament because this 
Parliament has attracted those individuals who have a strong desire to enjoy high salaries and at 
the same time they have high proclivity for shirking on the job.  Call these type-X individuals.  If 
the labor supply of such type-X individuals is highly responsive to income, this could be the 
reason for estimating a significant relationship between salaries and attendance. 
 Column (1) of Table 5 has reported the results obtained from the freshmen sample.  
These are the individuals who are elected for the first time to the sixth or the seventh 
Parliaments.   Freshmen of the sixth Parliament consist of two groups:   Those who are re-elected 
to the seventh Parliament, and those who did not run for re-election, or did not get re-elected.  
Based on the argument above, dropping the group of not-re-elected freshmen of the sixth 
Parliament from the sample of all freshmen generates a sample of arguably type-X freshmen 
(those who got themselves elected to the seventh Parliament).  Table 8 displays various models 
estimated using all freshmen (columns 1, 3, 5, and 7) as well as type-X freshmen (columns 2, 4, 
6 and 8).  The estimated coefficients are not larger, but actually smaller in the type-X sample, 23 
 
indicating that the results are not likely due to self-selection of type-X individuals to the seventh 
Parliament.   The exact same analysis is conducted using the seasoned parliamentarian sample.  
Dropping those seasoned parliamentarians who are not re-elected to the seventh Parliament 
(using only type-X seasoned parliamentarians) did not change the estimated coefficients. 
 
VII. Summary and Conclusions 
  Using data on the members of the European Parliament from 2004 to 2011 we provide 
estimates of income elasticity of labor supply as well as uncompensated wage elasticity.  The 
compensation structure of the European Parliament and the data compiled by the European 
Union provide a unique setting for this analysis.  This is because for each member of the 
European Parliament, the labor supply (the number of planetary sessions attended), the daily 
wage rate (compensation provided for each plenary session attended), and unearned income 
(fixed salary, which is independent of attendance) are measured with precision.  Furthermore, we 
exploit a major exogenous change in the salary structure that took place in 2009.  Prior to July 
2009, each member of the European Parliament was paid a salary determined by their home 
country.  As a result, there was considerable variation in salaries, ranging from €10,226 
(Bulgarian members) to  €142,146 (Italian members).  Starting with the seventh Parliament in 
July 2009 the salary of each member of the Parliament is pegged to 38.5 percent of a European 
Court judge's salary, paid by the EU.  Thus, the salary of each member was set to €91,983 in July 
2009, which created an exogenous (and in most cases substantial) increase/decrease in unearned 
income for the members of the parliament. 
We control for personal attributes of the parliamentarians as well as per capita income 
and the corruption in their home country.  We analyze the sample of members who were in the 24 
 
European Parliament both before and after the change in the salary structure.  We find that an 
increase in salaries, which represents an increase in unearned income, is statistically significantly 
related to labor supply with an elasticity of about -0.06.    We also analyze the sample of 
freshman parliamentarians as well as the sample of seasoned parliamentarians and find similar 
elasticities in these samples.  
Members of the European Parliament also receive per diem compensation for each 
plenary session they attend.  This per diem is above and beyond the compensation for travel 
expenses related to attending the sessions and therefore it represents the daily wage rate for the 
parliamentarian.  We find that the elasticity of labor supply with respect to this daily wage is 
about 1.0.  We also find that age has a non-linear impact on attendance and that attendance peaks 
at age 59.  The extent of corruption in the home country is negatively related to the number of 
sessions attended among seasoned parliamentarians (but not among freshmen).  For example, a 
seasoned member of the EU Parliament (one who was has served in the Parliament during a 
previous term), who represents a country with a moderate level of corruption (e.g. Italy or 
Romania) attends two fewer plenary sessions (out of an average of 25 sessions) in comparison to 
a member whose country has a low level of corruption (such as Finland). 
The EU Parliamentarians are responsible for passing laws that govern the 27 member 
countries; they have control over the EU budget, and they supervise the other EU institutions.
26   
Consequently, given the significance of the job, it could be presumed that the attendance records 
of the parliamentarians would not react to the variation in salaries.  The results show that this is 
not the case and that leisure is a normal good for the members of the European Parliament.  
                                                            
26 For more information about the duties and responsibilities of the EU Parliament see 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/european-parliament/index_en.htm 25 
 
Furthermore, the estimated elasticity is very similar to those obtained from other settings, such as 








European Parliament Plenary Session Dates & Parliamentarian Salary Sources  
 
Salary Source  Period  Parliament 
Plenary 
Sessions 
Start Date  End Date 
Home country  1  6
th 23  July 20,2004  December 31, 2004 
Home country  2  6
th  36  Jan 1, 2005  August 31, 2005 
Home country  3  6
th  23  September 1, 2005  December 31, 2005 
Home country  4  6
th  37  January 1, 2006  August 31, 2006 
Home country  5  6
th  25  September 1, 2006  December 31, 2006 
Home country  6  6
th  37  January 1, 2007  August 31, 2007 
Home country  7  6
th  25  September 1, 2007  December 31, 2007 
Home country  8  6
th  39  January 1, 2008  August 31, 2008 
Home country  9  6
th  24  September 1, 2008  December 31, 2008 
Home country  10  6
th  28  January 1, 2009  June 13, 2009 
 Election         
EU; € 91,983   11  7
th  23  July 14, 2009  December 31, 2009 
EU; € 93,686  12  7
th  35  January 1, 2010  August 31, 2010 
EU; € 93,686  13  7
th  24  September 1, 2010  December 31, 2010 
EU; € 95,483  14  7
th  25  January 1, 2011  August 31, 2011* 
Notes: Until the 7
th Parliament, the salaries of the EU Parliamentarians were paid by their home country. 
Although the official end date of each plenary session is August 31, the sessions effectively end in mid-July.  There 
are no meetings between mid-July and end of August. 




Salaries and Distribution of Seats in the European Parliament 
 at the end of the 6
th Parliament in June 2009 




Austria 18  2.32%  110,330 
Belgium 23  2.96%  72,948 
Bulgaria 18  2.32%  10,226 
Cyprus 6  0.77%  44,129 
Czech Republic  24  3.09%  29,368 
Denmark 14  1.80%  73,248 
Estonia 6  0.77%  31,144 
Finland 14  1.80%  65,779 
France 78  10.05%  77,838 
Germany 98  12.63%  85,319 
Greece 24  3.09%  76,141 
Hungary 24  3.09%  44,029 
Ireland 12  1.55%  95,930 
Italy 78  10.05%  142,146 
Latvia 8  1.03%  16,276 
Lithuania 13  1.68%  14,197 
Luxembourg 6 0.77%  69,613 
Malta 5  0.64%  16,604 
Netherlands 27  3.48%  80,474 
Poland 53  6.83%  29,209 
Portugal 24  3.09%  50,102 
Romania 33  4.25%  21,746 
Slovakia 14  1.80%  15,900 
Slovenia 7  0.90%  51,815 
Spain 52  6.70%  41,847 
Sweden 19  2.45%  65,079 
United Kingdom  78  10.05%  84,054 
Distribution of seats reflects the composition of the European Parliament before the 2009 elections. 
Salaries represent average annual salaries paid by home country during the 6







(1) (2) (3)  (4) 




th Parliament & 











Attendance 25.221  25.389  25.152  25.309 
(6.274) (6.150) (6.418)  (6.085) 
Salary (1,000 €)  76.679  75.982  68.590  87.079 
(30.355) (28.190) (34.458)  (19.682) 
Per diem pay  284.967 284.968 284.459  285.620 
(12.860) (12.919) (12.596)  (13.165) 
Real salary  71.927  71.228  64.386  81.624 
(28.300) (26.106) (32.106)  (18.392) 
Real per diem pay  268.113 268.004 268.293  267.880 
(8.518) (8.471) (8.710)  (8.259) 
Tenure in 6
th or 7
th parliament  5.801  7.259  4.466  7.518 
(3.707) (3.993) (2.793)  (4.019) 
Political group attendance (%)  87.619  87.764  87.413  87.883 
(2.778) (2.680) (2.820)  (2.700) 
Age 53.311  52.871  51.277  55.927 
(10.137) (9.569) (10.612)  (8.828) 
Female 0.314  0.324  0.311  0.318 
(0.464) (0.468) (0.463)  (0.466) 
PhD-MD 0.244  0.256  0.269  0.213 
(0.430) (0.436) (0.443)  (0.410) 
Corruption 20.083  18.498  23.497  15.692 
(12.270) (11.776) (12.790)  (9.976) 
Per capita GDP  27.148  27.797  24.835  30.122 
(8.126) (8.104) (7.908)  (7.403) 
Member in 1
st Parliament  0.011  0.006  0.026 
(0.106) (0.076)  (0.159) 
Member in 2
nd Parliament  0.031  0.023  0.071 
(0.173) (0.151)  (0.256) 
Member in 3
rd Parliament  0.063  0.072  0.145 
(0.244) (0.259)  (0.352) 
Member in 4
th Parliament  0.165  0.182  0.378 
(0.371) (0.386)  (0.485) 
Member in 5
th Parliament  0.334  0.384  0.764 
(0.472) (0.486)  (0.425) 
Member in 6
th Parliament  0.852  1.000  0.746  0.988 
(0.356) (0.000) (0.436)  (0.110) 29 
 
Table 3A (concluded) 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) 











th Parliament  0.634  1.000  0.616  0.657 
(0.482) (0.000) (0.487)  (0.475) 
The unit of observation is parliamentarian-plenary session (There are 14 plenary sessions during 






Individual Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N  Mean  Std.  Dev  Min  Max 
Female 1,151  0.321  0.467  0  1 
PhD-MD 1,151  0.222  0.416  0  1 
Age 1,151  50.381  10.323  24  81 
Member in 1
st Parliament  1,151  0.010  0.097  0  1 
Member in 2
nd Parliament  1,151  0.025  0.157  0  1 
Member in 3
rd Parliament  1,151  0.047  0.212  0  1 
Member in 4
th Parliament  1,151  0.124  0.330  0  1 
Member in 5
th Parliament  1,151  0.252  0.434  0  1 
Member in 6
th Parliament  1,151  0.675  0.469  0  1 
Member in 7
th Parliament  1,151  0.639  0.481  0  1 
Corruption 1,151  21.428  13.139  1  48 
Per Capita GDP (1,000 $)  1,151  26.167  8.230  10.74826  68.85345 
There are 1,115 unique parliamentarians who served in the sixth and the seventh 
parliaments between 2004 and 2011.  The summary statistics in the table pertain to the 
first time the parliamentarian is observed during this time period.  This date is either July 
2004 (for those who are elected to the sixth parliament), July 2009 (for those who were 
elected to the seventh Parliament and who were not in the sixth Parliament), or 2007 for 
the members from Romania and Bulgaria as these countries became members of the EU 
in 2007. 





The Impact of Salary on Attendance to the Plenary Sessions 
  Whole Sample  Re-elected for the 7
th 
Parliamentary Term 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Real Salary (1,000 Euros)  -0.013***  -0.026***  -0.014***  -0.020*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Tenure in 6
th or 7
th  parliament  0.918 0.004 1.763 0.011 
(0.840) (0.049) (1.448) (0.063) 
Real per diem pay  0.094***  0.094***  0.084***  0.093** 
(0.013) (0.029) (0.018) (0.038) 
Political group attendance (%)  0.032 0.095**  0.087**  0.199*** 
(0.028) (0.042) (0.036) (0.062) 
Per capita GDP  0.068  -0.007  0.116*  -0.010 
(0.049) (0.017) (0.060) (0.026) 
Corruption -0.007  -0.017*  -0.002  -0.034** 
(0.014) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017) 
Age 0.236***  0.298*** 
(0.067) (0.099) 
Age
2 -0.002***  -0.003*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Female 0.004  -0.158 
(0.170) (0.232) 
PhD-MD 0.015  -0.128 
(0.211) (0.280) 
N  9,836 9,836 4,775 4,775 
Individual fixed effects  Yes No Yes No 
Indicators for previous 
parliamentary memberships  No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of plenary sessions a parliamentarian attended in a period.  The first two 
columns employ the whole sample, and the last two columns employ the parliamentarians who served in both the 6
th 
and the 7
th Parliaments. Odd-numbered columns report the results from regressions that include individual fixed 
effects and even-numbered column report the results of the models that include individual characteristics. All 
regressions include indicators for periods and an overall time trend.  Clustered standard errors are reported in 





The Impact of Salary on Attendance to the Plenary Sessions  
Freshman and Seasoned Parliamentarians 
Freshmen Seasoned  Members 
(1) (2) (3) 
Real Salary (1,000 Euros)  -0.030***  -0.027***  -0.012 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Tenure in 6
th or 7
th parliament  0.038  0.912**  -0.116** 
(0.064) (0.462) (0.055) 
Real per diem pay  0.113***  0.134***  0.157*** 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.034) 
Political group attendance (%)  0.072  0.059  0.116* 
(0.049) (0.039) (0.060) 
Per capita GDP  0.013  0.093  -0.023 
(0.020) (0.068) (0.026) 
Corruption -0.002  -0.030  -0.057*** 
(0.011) (0.027) (0.016) 
Age 0.211**  0.298*** 
(0.082) (0.111) 
Age
2 -0.002**  -0.003** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Female 0.144  -0.163 
(0.218) (0.249) 
PhD-MD -0.029  0.057 
(0.267) (0.291) 
N  5533 4303 4303 
Individual fixed effects  No Yes No 
Indicators for previous 
parliamentary membership  Yes No Yes 
The dependent variable is the number of plenary sessions attended in a period.  The first column employs the sample 
of freshman parliamentarians (who are elected to the parliament for first time), and the last two columns employ the 
sample of seasoned parliamentarians (who had been elected to the parliament at least once before All regressions 
include indicators for periods and an overall time trend. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, 




The Impact of Salary on Average Attendance to the Plenary Sessions by Parliament 









First Differences  OLS  OLS  FE 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Real Salary (1,000 Euros)  -0.019***  -0.029***  -0.013*  -0.022** 
(0.005) (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.009) 
Tenure in 6
th or 7
th parliament  0.860  0.465  -0.111*  1.610 
(0.734) (0.619)  (0.057)  (1.060) 
Real per diem pay  -0.452**  0.044  -0.040  -0.045 
(0.229) (0.169)  (0.068)  (0.061) 
Political group attendance (%) 0.086  0.122**  0.168**  0.324 
(0.058) (0.057)  (0.067)  (0.198) 
Per capita GDP  0.210***  0.003  -0.027  -0.200* 
(0.075) (0.020)  (0.024)  (0.117) 
Corruption 0.019  -0.013  -0.048***  -0.076 
(0.026) (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.046) 
Age 0.198***  0.347***  1.005*** 
(0.071) (0.109) (0.355) 
Age
2 -0.002***  -0.003***  -0.009** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Female 0.198  -0.178  -1.005 
(0.194) (0.228) (1.244) 
PhD-MD 0.010  -0.060  3.460* 
(0.246) (0.264) (1.931) 
N 361  850  662  54 
The dependent variable in the first three columns is the average number of plenary sessions a parliamentarian 
attended in a parliamentary term. The dependent variable in the fourth column is the average number of plenary 
sessions parliamentarians from a country attended in a parliamentary term. First regression is estimated with OLS on 
the first differences of the variables. Only those who were re-elected for the 7
th parliamentary term are included in 
the first column. The samples in the second and third columns employ freshman and seasoned parliamentarians, 
respectively. Regressions include full set of control variables. All regressions except the first include an indicator for 
the seventh parliamentary term. Fourth column includes country fixed effects. Clustered standard errors are reported 





The Impact of Salary on Attendance to the Plenary Sessions  
Freshman and Seasoned Parliamentarians 
(Using the first 4 plenary sessions in the 6
th and 7
th Parliaments) 
Freshmen Seasoned  Members 
(1) (2) (3) 
Real Salary (1,000 Euros)  -0.031***  -0.033***  -0.015* 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Tenure in 6
th or 7
th  parliament  -0.466* 0.480 -0.096* 
(0.248) (0.529) (0.057) 
Real per diem pay  0.175***  1.695***  0.143*** 
(0.037) (0.040) (0.035) 
Political group attendance (%) 0.101**  0.110**  0.172*** 
(0.050) (0.051) (0.057) 
Per capita GDP  0.010  0.137*  -0.028 
(0.020) (0.081) (0.024) 
Corruption 0.000  -0.014  -0.047*** 
(0.010) (0.027) (0.015) 
Age 0.121  0.325*** 
(0.076) (0.109) 
Age
2 -0.001  -0.003*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Female 0.160  -0.195 
(0.201) (0.220) 
PhD-MD -0.003  -0.061 
(0.255) (0.266) 
N  2852 2598 2598 
Individual fixed effects  No Yes No 
Indicators for previous 
parliamentary membership  Yes No Yes 
The dependent variable is the number of plenary sessions attended in a period.  All regression employ 8 plenary 
sessions (The 4 plenary sessions that took place between 2009 and 2011 in the seventh Parliament and the first 4 
plenary sessions of the sixth parliament). The first column employs the sample of freshman parliamentarians (who 
are elected to the parliament for first time), and the last two columns employ the sample of seasoned 
parliamentarians (who had been elected to the parliament at least once before All regressions include indicators for 
periods and an overall time trend. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 






Responsiveness of Freshmen Parliamentarians 
Dependent variable: 
Days Attended in Each Period 
Dependent variable: 
Average Attendance in 6
th or 7
th Terms 
  All Periods  First Four Periods of each 



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Real Salary (1,000 Euros)  -0.030***  -0.024***  -0.031***  -0.024**  -0.029***  -0.028***  -0.029***  -0.020** 
(0.005)  (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) 
Tenure in 6
th or 7
th parliament  0.038  0.191**  -0.466*  -0.128  0.465  1.492*  4.533***  3.801*** 
(0.064)  (0.096) (0.248) (0.264) (0.619) (0.866) (1.129) (1.177) 
Real per diem pay  0.113***  0.091***  0.175***  0.131***  0.044  0.277  2.461***  1.988*** 
(0.016)  (0.021) (0.037) (0.043) (0.169) (0.256) (0.388) (0.456) 
Political group attendance (%)  0.072  0.169***  0.101** 0.224*** 0.122** 0.192*** 0.114*  0.146** 
(0.049)  (0.054) (0.050) (0.059) (0.057) (0.064) (0.059) (0.065) 
Per capita GDP  0.013  -0.015  0.010  -0.011  0.003  -0.013  0.000  -0.012 
(0.020)  (0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) 
Corruption -0.002  -0.035***  0.000  -0.021  -0.013  -0.033***  -0.000  -0.024** 
(0.011)  (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Age  0.211** 0.121  0.121  0.047  0.198***  0.106 0.140* 0.079 
(0.082)  (0.092) (0.076) (0.089) (0.071) (0.084) (0.079) (0.085) 
Age
2 -0.002**  -0.001  -0.001  -0.000  -0.002***  -0.001  -0.001*  -0.001 
(0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female  0.144 0.117 0.160 0.069 0.198 0.142 0.204 0.093 
(0.218)  (0.224) (0.201) (0.212) (0.194) (0.199) (0.204) (0.203) 
PhD-MD -0.029  0.018  -0.003  -0.246  0.010  -0.015  -0.012  0.096 
(0.267)  (0.289) (0.255) (0.282) (0.246) (0.271) (0.260) (0.279) 
N 5,533  3,406  2,852  1,832  850  585  734  545 
The dependent variable in the first four columns is the number of plenary sessions a parliamentarian attended in a period.  The dependent variable in the last four columns is the 
average number of plenary sessions a parliamentarian attended in a parliamentary term. All regressions employ OLS on the sample indicated at the top of the column. Type-X 
freshmen constitute a subset of All Freshmen. They are those who are either: 1) Newly elected to the 7
th Parliament 2) Are freshmen in the 6
th Parliament and will be re-elected to 
the 7
th Parliament.   Standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.36 
 
Figure 1 





Difference in Salary and Attendance between the Austrian, Irish and Italian Members, 
 and Other Members 
 
Notes: The dashed line represents the difference in the attendance rates between the members from High-Salary 
countries and Low-Salary countries. The solid line displays the difference in salaries between the members from 
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